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Abstract
Four overlapping analytical frameworks focusing upon domestic British politics are applied to 
explain the detailed development of the policy on the euro maintained by the Conservative 
Government then Party in opposition and the Labour Party opposition and then Government: intra-
party politics; inter-party politics; public opinion and the nature of British democracy; and neo-
pluralism (competing economic and other interests). This article posits that British government - 
and in particular Labour Government - reluctance to hold a referendum on euro membership and 
actively push a pro-euro policy can be best explained in terms of ideologically infused intra- (rather 
than inter-) party politics and the realities of pluralist politics, while explanations rooted in an 
analysis of public opinion are less helpful. 
Kurzfassung
Vier überlappende analytische Rahmen, die auf die britische Innenpolitik fokussieren, werden 
angewandt, um die detaillierte Entwicklung der Politik zum Euro zu erklären, wie sie von der 
konservativen Regierung (später Oppositionspartei) und der Labour-Oppositions-Partei (später 
Regierung) sowohl als innerparteiliche Politik, Politik zwischen den Parteien, in der öffentlichen 
Meinung und der Natur der Britischen Demokratie als auch im Zuge des Neoliberalismus (im 
Wettkampf mit wirtschaftlichen uns anderen Interessen) verfochten wurden. Dieser Artikel 
postuliert, dass die Ablehnung der britischen Regierung – und insbesondere der Labour-
Regierung , ein Referendum zum Euro-Beitritt abzuhalten und eine Pro-Euro-Politik aktiv zu 
forcieren, am besten als ideologisch durchdrungene innerparteiliche (vielmehr als zwischen-
parteiliche) Politik und Realität pluralistischer Politik erklärt werden kann, während sich 
Erklärungen, die auf einer Analyse der öffentlichen Meinung basieren, als weniger hilfreich 
erweisen. 
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1. Introduction   
British entry in the Third Stage of EMU and adoption of the euro to replace the pound has been one 
of the most divisive issues in British politics since the debates on the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. The start of Stage Three, the worrying slide of the exchange rate of the euro and the debates 
on the application of the Stability Pact rules exacerbated the intensity of the debate. This article 
examines four leading domestic political explanations of British policy on the euro: intra-party 
political (ideological divisions and leadership battles), inter-party political-electoral, public opinion 
focused, pluralistic (interest group). Other explanations have been posited by various academics 
including: structuralist (Talani 2000a & b, George 1998 and Young 1999); ideological-economic 
(Blair 2002); geo-strategic (George 1989); ideological-nationalist (Berrington and Hague 1998; Blair 
2002; Rawnsley 2001; Seldon 2001; Young 1999 and Wilks 1996; with Risse 2003 writing on 
identity politics and the euro); and liberal intergovernmentalist (Moravcsik 1998). While ideology – 
notably views on the nation state, European integration and on economic matters – infuses the 
domestic political debate, ideological explanations for British policy on the euro are not explored 
here. The degree to which the economic debate on British participation in EMU – with the 
arguments against tending to gain the upper hand in British academic and political debate – is also 
not examined here. (See Forder and Huhne (1999) and Blair (2002) for a rehearsal of these 
arguments and the latter for a further analysis of the economic debate). This article posits that British 
government – and in particular Labour Government – reluctance to support British membership of 
EMU can be explained more in terms of ideologically infused intra- (rather than inter-) party politics 
and the realities of pluralist politics, while explanations rooted in an analysis of public opinion are 
less helpful. The article also compares the relevance of the four domestic political explanations of 
British policy with regard to the positioning of respectively the two largest political parties in the 
country: (New) Labour and Conservative (Tory).  
Explaining British Policy on the Euro
David Howarth
European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 8 (2004) N° 17;  
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-017a.htm
Date of Publication in  : 6.10.2004
| Abstract | Back to homepage | PDF |  
| This paper's comments page | Send your comment! to this paper |
 
Seite 1 von 19 EIoP: Text 2004-017: Full Text
06.10.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-017.htm2
Much has been written of Britain’s ‘awkward partner’ (George 1989) or ‘semi-detached’ (Bulmer) 
status in the country’s relations with Europe (see also Baker 2001, 2002; Baker and Seawright 1998; 
Bishop 2003; Hale 1999 and Young 1999) and a diversity of explanations for this ‘awkwardness’ 
have been provided. Numerous examples serve to illustrate British scepticism towards European 
integration: from the decision not to join the original communities in the 1950s, the demands for a 
renegotiated terms of entry, the budget rebate debate of the early 1980s, to the opt outs on the social 
protocol and EMU in the Maastricht Treaty and obstructionism in EU policy-making during the BSE 
(‘mad cow’) crisis. The very large majority of British politicians – Labour, Conservative or Liberal 
Democrat (the third, relatively pro-European party) – oppose any form of European federalism. Most 
Conservatives, many Labour and even many Liberal Democrat politicians have been principally 
interested in (or, in the case of left-wing Labour, opposed to) the EU as a regional free-trading bloc. 
The transfer of policy making to the EU level in most areas has been opposed by British 
governments and, when accepted, only at an intergovernmental level.  
For Young (1999, 492), Prime Minister Tony Blair’s favourable but hesitant position on the euro 
simply demonstrates the traditional European policy line of British political leaders ‘who … were 
sceptical about the success of the weird integrationist scheme, and argued that we must wait and see 
if the Common Market worked, which it probably wouldn’t’. Thus, the Prime Minister’s 
announcement in the Autumn of 1997 not to participate in the euro from 1 January 1999 reflects ‘the 
politics … the culture and the psychology’ of the United Kingdom (493). Explaining Conservative 
and Labour government policies on the euro in terms of this traditional ‘reluctance’ and 
‘awkwardness’ leaves many questions unanswered about the details of British policy.  
2. An overview of Conservative and Labour government policy
  
On the euro, Conservative government policy prior to 1997 was to forward an alternative policy for 
monetary integration and then, when this had clearly failed to win over the other European 
governments, demand a British optional opt-out from Stage Three (thus accepting the 
macroeconomic convergence of Stage Two but refusing the single currency) with a ‘wait and see’ 
policy, according to which the success of EMU and Britain’s outsider position would be evaluated 
once EMU began (Stephens 1996). Under the leadership of John Major, the Conservative 
government initially maintained a ‘non-position’ on the euro, not ruling out a referendum prior to the 
start of stage three of EMU (in 1997 or 1999) but not promising one either (George 1998), publicly 
believing and hoping that the project would collapse. In the Spring of 1996, Conservative Central 
Office (not the government) stated in a protocol that if, following the 1997 elections, it adopted a 
position in favour of the euro, it would then hold a referendum prior to British entry. This was not 
much of a commitment on the matter. ‘Wait and see with extreme scepticism’, one leading 
commentator has called the Conservative position (Young 1999, 467). In the meantime, many 
Conservative MPs fought the 1997 election with a ‘never’ policy on the euro. In opposition since 
1997 – under the leadership of William Hague, then, from September 2001, Ian Duncan Smith (IDS) 
and then, from November 2003, Michael Howard – the Conservative leadership’s position became 
more rhetorically hostile to membership, demanding an immediate referendum on the euro, 
criticising the Labour government’s ‘five economic tests’ established ostensibly to determine the 
appropriate timing of British entry (see below) and promising a no reconsideration policy for the life 
of the next Conservative government and then a policy shift only following a referendum in the life 
of the subsequent government. Interestingly, official Conservative policy has never promised to seek 
to keep Britain out of the euro-zone indefinitely. 
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In opposition, the Labour party during the early 1990s was very much in favour of British 
participation in stage three of EMU. Enthusiasm moderated after the forced British departure from 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). The party (as 
‘New Labour’ under the leadership of Tony Blair from July 1994) only embraced the idea of a 
referendum on the issue – on which Blair would personally campaign for the ‘yes’ side – a few 
months after the change in Conservative party policy on a referendum in 1996. In the lead-up to the 
1997 elections, Blair became even more cautious in his pro-euro rhetoric. Once in government from 
June 1997, Blair balanced carefully between an enthusiastically pro-‘Europe’ rhetoric, a cautiously 
pro-euro position and a hesitancy on setting a date for a referendum on the matter. The 
announcement in the week following the election of the decision to render the Monetary Committee 
of the Bank of England autonomous suggested strongly that the new government was preparing the 
country for eventual membership. However, on 27 October 1997, the Labour Government made a 
clear pledge not to join EMU during the life of the government until following elections in 2001. 
Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, told the House of Commons that disjunctions 
between the British and EU economies prevented any rapid move to British membership but also 
that membership should take place if the economic benefits were ‘clear and unambiguous’ which 
signposted the priority of politics in any future decision on the euro! Brown called for government 
efforts to align the British and EU economic cycles but also efforts to prepare public opinion for 
eventual membership. The government sought to legitimize its policy with a veneer of economic 
analysis, allowing a referendum on the policy only once its five economic tests had been satisfied (as 
determined officially by the Treasury) (Treasury 1997).(1) These five tests comprise the following:  
z ‘whether there can be sustainable convergence between Britain and the countries of the single 
currency;  
z whether there is sufficient flexibility [in the British economy] to cope with economic change;  
z the effect on investment [in Britain];  
z othe impact on [Britain’s] financial services industry;  
z (and) whether [euro zone membership] is good for employment’  
The continued cyclical divergence of the British and continental European economies could stand as 
a perpetual reason to block British membership. A 2000 OECD study of the British economy 
suggested that on ‘several scores … Britain is projected to be as close, or even closer to the 
economic centre of the euro than some of the current ‘ins’ and several respected British economists 
have concurred.(2) However, this degree of convergence did not lead the government to conclude 
that the test had been satisfied. On 9 June 2003, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, 
presented the Treasury’s 18 reports on the five tests to the House of Commons, concluding that only 
one of the criteria had been met – the success of British financial services in adjusting to EMU – but 
that progress was being made in meeting the others. Gordon Brown and the Treasury defended the 
reports as the ‘best application’ of economic theory to a public policy decision in the history of 
British government’. It certainly cost more ink and paper than any previous Treasury study. 
However, the reports also conveniently embody the full ambiguity of the Labour Government’s 
policy of ‘Yes in principle but only when the timing is right’, postponing any decision on holding a 
referendum until after the next legislative elections at the earliest following a further assessment.  
The five economic tests conform in many respects to the conditions laid down by the Major 
Government prior to the 1997 elections. However, since the elections, the rhetoric of the two leading 
parties has been markedly different: Tory, the rather negative and pessimistic ‘wait and see’; Labour, 
the more positive and cautiously optimistic ‘prepare and decide’ (Blair 2002). There have been two 
principal differences in real policy between the two parties: engagement to convince the public and 
precision.  
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First, the Labour Government is – at least officially, if not much in practice – committed to leading a 
change in public opinion on the euro. Second, the Labour Government has outlined specific plans for 
the move by the UK to membership in EMU. Brown set up the Business Advisory Group (BAG) in 
late 1997 to examine the practical implications of EMU.(3) The Treasury’s Outline National 
Changeover Plan of February 1999 (Treasury 1999) – modified by a revised second plan in March 
2000 (Treasury 2000) presents a draft timetable for joining, the central government’s preparations to 
date and to come, and recommendations to a number of sectors of the economy to prepare them for 
membership (the preparation among British business for EMU membership is acknowledged to be 
‘poor’). The 18 Treasury reports of June 2003 also propose necessary developments in the British 
economy to enable four of the five tests to be met in the upcoming years. As one practical step, 
Gordon Brown hired the services of a professor of economics at Imperial College to looking into 
encouraging the use of longer-term fixed rate mortgages which would diminish the impact of 
accession to the euro-zone on the UK housing market and economy.  
3. Intra-party politics: ideological squabbling and leadership 
manoeuvres  
Aspinwall (1999) examines the impact of the British electoral system to explain the reluctance of the 
two largest parties on the most sensitive European questions. The First-Past-the-Post (plurality / 
single-member district) system contributes to the deep divisions that plague the Conservative and 
Labour parties on the Europe issue. The FPTP system penalises small parties (without a regional 
vote concentration) while favouring the two dominant parties which remain broad churches of 
opinion. Much of the anti-Europe opinion on the left and the right will remain in the two main 
parties. This anti-integration opinion cannot be ignored by Labour and Conservative leaderships: 
they still need these voters and party supporters to secure parliamentary majorities, especially 
because euro-phobes and sceptics are more likely to turn out to vote than the euro-agnostics. Both 
Labour and the Conservatives must tolerate a degree of internal dissent and both must tailor at least 
some of their programmes and policies towards these supporters. This is especially true for the 
Conservative party (Berrington and Hague 1998) but Labour must also still play this game with its 
left-wing and some of the affiliated trade unions such as the RMT (transport union) (Gamble and 
Kelly 2000). Major and Blair both embraced a policy centred on economic appropriateness and a 
referendum in order to defuse the divisiveness of the issue within their respective parties.  
Currently the divide between pro and anti-euro factions within the Conservative Party is very heavily 
weighted in favour of the latter, with very active anti-euro groups with large memberships – notably 
Conservatives Against a Federal Europe – opposing less active groups with less membership, 
including the ‘Tory Reform Group’, ‘Conservative Group for Europe’ (Leon Brittan) and the ‘Tory 
Europe Network’ (which Kenneth Clark launched in the Times on 14 May 2002). Although less 
divided than the pre-1997 Conservatives on the question of the euro (Gamble and Kelly 2000), there 
persist important divisions on the euro question within the Labour government and backbench. These 
divisions were given organisational form in 2002 with the creation of polarised party groups: the 
pro-euro ‘Labour Movement for Europe’ and its rivals the ‘Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign’ and 
‘Labour Against the Euro’(4) set up in early 2002, which makes the establishment of a more 
committed Labour government policy line more politically problematic than would have been the 
case in the government’s first term.  
 
 
 
Seite 4 von 19 EIoP: Text 2004-017: Full Text
06.10.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-017.htm5
The divisions within the two major parties relate to on-going battles for leadership, with regard to 
which European issues (and in particular the euro) have considerable relevance. This is most obvious 
in the Conservative party. Throughout his period as Prime Minister, John Major was plagued by 
constant challenges to his leadership led by anti-Europeans because of his support for the Maastricht 
Treaty (Young 1999) and sought to weaken the challenge to his leadership through the adoption of 
the ‘wait and see’ policy. The democratisation of the Conservative leadership selection process in 
1997 pulled the party leadership in a considerably more Eurosceptic direction better reflecting the 
views of the ageing party rank and file which is overwhelmingly hostile to euro membership.(5) 
William Hague and Ian Duncan Smith (IDS) adopted a strong anti-euro (and anti-EU: ‘in Europe; 
not run by Europe’) rhetorical position (being selected over the more experienced and well-known 
pro-euro / EU contenders Michael Portillo and Ken Clark). It is particularly demonstrative of the 
relative importance of intra-party squabbling that IDS based his leadership campaign on an anti-
euro / EU stance even though Hague’s strategy to focus on European issues during the 2001 national 
elections clearly backfired (see below).  
Disagreements persist between the two leading Labour government actors on the euro. The quality 
British press has dedicated a considerable amount of attention to the relationship between the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown and Prime Minister Blair as a determining variable in 
the euro referendum debate. Brown has long coveted the leadership of the Labour Party and the post 
of Prime Minister and has always felt that Blair usurped the position from John Smith’s rightful heir 
as many in the Party desperately sought to appeal to the wavering voter of Middle England. 
Although Brown joined Blair to establish the pro-Euro / Europe campaign group Britain in Europe, 
Blair has been widely reported as the more pro-euro / European of the two (Blair 2002). Despite 
Blair’s growing public support for British entry, it is claimed that Brown has repeatedly 
demonstrated his reluctance, most notably, through his reported ‘non-commitment’ at Treasury 
Select Committee sessions on the euro in February 2003 (Miles 2004).  
The use of the five economic tests has reinforced the power of Brown over the timing of any future 
referendum, essentially giving the Chancellor of the Exchequer ‘a veto over if and when the 
government recommended entry’ (Stephens 2001, 201). Moreover, the use of the tests has also 
reduced divisions in the Labour Government, notably between Brown and the pro-euro Foreign 
Secretary, Robin Cook. It has been claimed that Brown has the final say on the holding of the euro 
referendum but that he has not chosen to allow a referendum given the danger that it could create for 
his ambition to become Prime Minister. Tony Blair, bearing in mind the fate of the Conservative 
Party during the 1990s, was concerned by the potential divisiveness within the Labour party that the 
euro issue could create. Blair sought to suppress Cook’s enthusiasm for the euro so as to prevent 
these divisions (See, for example, comments in the The Guardian, 8 July 2000). It is very likely that 
the replacement of Robin Cook as Foreign Secretary – an otherwise highly respected Foreign 
Secretary – in the June 2001 cabinet reshuffle with Jack Straw owed in large part to the former’s 
strong and vocal pro-euro position and the latter’s cautious Euroscepticism. In fact, all the foreign 
ministers were replaced with more cautious Eurosceptics, including the new Minister for Europe, 
Peter Hain. Blair sought to maintain unity in the government between the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and other leading ministers on the euro question. If the Prime Minister might have 
previously been interested in pressing Brown on a referendum, since the Iraq invasion – and the 
considerable drop in support for his leadership within the Labour Party and the country at large – 
Blair is now in no position to force a euro referendum if Brown remains opposed.  
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4. Inter-party politics   
The inter-party electoral competition dimension of the euro debates attracts considerable attention in 
the British press coverage of the issue. The two parties have over the past 14 years demarcated their 
differences on the euro for partisan purposes. A Downsian analysis (Downs 1957) of Conservative 
and Labour party euro policy would suggest that that the two leading British parties, competing for a 
large number of the same voters, would, acting rationally, embrace policies which correspond to the 
views of the majority of the voting population. A Downsian analysis provides a useful explanation of 
the shift in Labour policies in the 1980s on macroeconomic policy-making and European integration 
in terms of the party’s attempt to appear more credible to the majority of British voters after its poor 
record in government in the late 1970s and left-wing turn in opposition under the leadership of 
Michael Foot (Daniels 1998). On the euro, Conservative opposition but also the hesitation of the 
Labour government conform superficially to a Downsian analysis, although the marked differences 
in the rhetorical thrust of Conservative and Labour policies suggests limits to its explanatory use. 
The considerable emphasis placed on ‘saving the pound’ by the Conservative government and party 
in opposition in 1997 appears to go well beyond the moderate opposition of a large number of those 
who claim that they are opposed to the euro. Tory policy has been shaped by a virulent 
euroscepticism from within the party – as noted in the previous section – but also by the fear of a 
loss of votes to right-wing anti-European parties (Ashford 2000; Berrington and Hague 1998; 
Stephens 1996; Young 1999). The Referendum Party created and led initially by Sir James 
Goldsmith was committed to an immediate referendum on the Maastricht Treaty / further integration. 
Many Tory MPs adopted strong anti-euro positions in the 1992 election campaign to see off votes for 
Referendum Party candidates (Ashford 2000; Berrington and Hague 1998; Stephens 1996; Young 
1999). Goldsmith committed 20 million pounds of his personal fortune to the anti-euro cause and his 
party fielded 550 candidates in the 1992 elections. Although achieving the best showing for a single 
issue party in the history of British democracy, the Referendum Party only won 3.1 per cent of the 
vote in 1992 and even less in the 1997 elections. The UK Independence Party which also ran in the 
1997 and 2001 parliamentary elections (winning 3 per cent of the vote in the former) was less well-
funded but has had more staying power, winning 6.25 per cent of the vote in the June 1999 European 
Parliamentary elections and three seats (although hardly to the detriment of the Conservatives which 
did particularly well in those elections).  
It is important not to overestimate the extent to which former Conservative voters switched their 
allegiances because they sought a more specifically eurosceptic option. Many former Conservative 
supporters had left the party prior to the 1992 and 1997 elections for a variety of other reasons and 
then selected to vote for the Referendum and UK Independence parties rather than Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats because European integration was one of their preoccupations (Heath et al. 1998). 
Moreover, very few seats swung as a result of the Referendum Party’s success so Goldsmith’s aim to 
inflict maximum damage on the Conservatives must be deemed a failure. Nonetheless, the fear of 
Conservative strategists and many individual Conservative Members of Parliament of the loss of 
Eurosceptic supporters to these smaller parties has contributed to pulling the party in a more 
determined eurosceptic direction (Ashford 2000; Stephens 1996; Thompson 1996; Young 1999) 
contrary to the Downsian thesis which would predict a more moderate euroscepticism to correspond 
to the shift in British public opinion against further integration in the 1990s (Heath et al. 1998).  
 
 
 
 
Seite 6 von 19 EIoP: Text 2004-017: Full Text
06.10.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-017.htm7
The consistently hostile opinion of a majority of British voters towards the euro – albeit hostility of a 
shallow nature for many in this majority – has not convinced the Labour government to abandon its 
pro-euro rhetoric and commitment to membership. However, the Downsian thesis is apparently 
corroborated by the Labour Government’s exceedingly meek campaign on the euro. Tony Blair has 
thus opted to ignore the advice of a leading New Labour think-tank, the Foreign Policy Centre, 
which argues that the euro referendum could be won and demonstrates how (Leonard and Arbuthnott 
2001; Leonard 2003; Mortimer and Atkinson 2003). In September 2003, Simon Buckby, the director 
of the pro-euro Britain in Europe campaign – set up by Tony Blair and Gordon Blair and other pro-
euro politicians from the three major parties – announced his resignation, complaining the 
government was not pursuing a consistent strategy on the euro and failed to do much of anything to 
lead a change in public opinion: ‘one speech every six months does not a campaign make’ (quoted in 
the Guardian, 10 September 2003).  
A Downsian analysis might still be useful to explain recent Conservative party developments on the 
euro. Following the election of 1997, the Conservatives under William Hague, responding to 
demands within the party and the menace of the smaller Eurosceptic parties, became excessively 
hostile on European matters including the euro, highlighting the party’s Euroscepticism above other 
issues of greater concern to the general voting population. The strong anti-euro (‘a vote for Labour is 
a vote to lose the pound’) and more broadly Eurosceptic strategy(6) paid off for the Conservatives in 
the 1999 European Parliamentary elections, given poor voter turnout (at 23 per cent). However, in 
the parliamentary elections of 2001 – where the large majority of the voting population did not 
prioritise the euro – this strategy failed to win the Conservatives many votes.(7) The ‘Europe’ issue 
is important to many voters but not as important as Health and Education in the context of national 
elections and few voters feel passionate either way about ‘Europe’. The political salience of the 
‘Europe’ issue over time also varies a great deal, much more so than the salience of core public 
services. Periodic debates and discussions on the matter can have a major effect on the public’s 
perception of the issue’s importance: anticipation of the Chancellor’s speech on euro in June 2003 
sparked interest in Europe in May and June, with 22 and 26 per cent prioritising the matter. 
However, since then the issue has declined dramatically in salience to less than 13 per cent. Prior to 
the last two national elections, ‘Europe’ was prioritised by many but fell behind the more 
immediately salient issues of Health and Education.(8) In the lead up to the EP elections in June 
1999, ‘Europe’ was considered the most important issue but only by 37 per cent of the voting age 
population. In other words, prioritising opposition to the Europe and euro issue during elections 
might make some electoral sense for the Tories but it is only likely to pay significant electoral 
dividends in the context of European Parliamentary elections. The Conservative strategy to prioritise 
hostility to the ‘Europe’ and specifically euro issue might have been embraced because the 
Conservatives were unable to credibly challenge the Labour Government on Health and Education. 
In the population at large the intensity of negative attitudes to the euro is not great: polls consistently 
show that a large number of those who oppose euro membership could be persuaded in favour of it if 
it was thought that it would be good for the British economy.(9) Thus a Downsian analysis may not 
be able to explain the intensity of Conservative party anti-euro rhetoric from 1997 to 2003. However, 
it would suggest that the party would eventually tone down its rhetoric to appeal more to the 
moderate median voter which is favourable to EU membership but opposed somewhat to the euro.  
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5. Public Opinion: British policy as a reflection of a responsive 
democracy?   
The assumption of Downsian theory is that public opinion is the most important determining factor 
shaping the policy of ‘catch-all’ parties. The Labour Government’s constant use of focus groups 
during its first term in office suggests its responsiveness to public opinion. More recently, however, 
during the government’s second term it has embraced very unpopular decisions and stood by them – 
on foundation hospitals, the war on Iraq and top-up tuition fees for universities – each stance 
demonstrating that the government is willing to adopt policies that are far more unpopular than EMU 
membership. An issue here may be the extent to which the Conservative opposition can transform 
public frustration with the government on a particular matter into votes: the Conservatives are more 
likely to be able to do with the euro than these other unpopular policy decisions.  
British public opinion on the euro has been consistently negative over the last decade (see 
http://www.mori.com/europe/index.shtml for a full list of surveys since January 1999). Support for 
EMU rose slightly in the period around the Maastricht Summit of December 1991 – perhaps linked 
to partisan inspired opposition to the Conservative Government on the matter. The pound’s forced 
exist from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 
September 1992 (‘Black Wednesday’) marked the turning point for public opinion. Poll after poll, 
including Eurobarometer surveys, have shown a hostile British public.(10) If the drop in the value of 
the euro confirmed the suspicions of many opponents of the euro as to the workability of EMU, the 
recent rise of the euro in relation to the dollar has not yet had a noticeable effect on opinion. The 
Eurobarometer poll of 2003 showed only 24% in favour and 63% against British participation in the 
euro – considerably more negative than in both Denmark and Sweden where populations voted ‘no’ 
in their euro referenda. A plurality and frequently majority of the supporters of each of the three 
major parties (including the officially pro-euro Liberal Democrats) has been consistently opposed to 
euro-zone membership and in favour of a public debate and referendum prior to entry.(11)  
The Danish no to the euro (September 2000, 53 per cent against) and the Swedish no (of September 
2003, 56 per cent against) – despite overwhelming support of the political class, business and trade 
union leadership and most of the media – have reinforced perceptions that it is not necessary for the 
British to join the euro (Miles 2004).(12) The results are particularly discouraging for the Labour 
Government which does not want to embark on a referendum campaign that it is unlikely to win, 
especially given that it has conditioned holding the referendum on the Treasury’s green light based 
on meeting the five economic tests and an officially pro-euro government position. Likewise, the 
results of the Swedish referendum result confirms the sensible politics of the Brown’s cautious 
strategy. In the view of the Guardian newspaper (15 September 2003): ‘Tony Blair’s lingering hopes 
of staging a euro referendum in this parliament were finally shattered’. The failure of the Eurogroup 
to apply the Stability Pact rules with regard to France and Germany has likely further increased 
public scepticism with regard to the euro.  
However, other polling results suggest that negative public opinion is not an overwhelming obstacle 
to entry and that public opposition to other government policies is greater and more intense (such as 
the war on Iraq). While a majority of the public oppose Britain adopting the euro, a large majority 
(74 per cent) also think that it is very (31 per cent) or fairly likely (43 per cent) that Britain will 
adopt the euro in the next five years.(13) The intensity of feeling on the euro issue has already been 
mentioned in the inter-party section. However, it bares repeating that polls show consistently that a 
sufficiently large number of people could be convinced to join the euro it they were convinced that 
the euro would have a good effect on the economy.(14)
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Hix (2000) provides the most detailed examination of British public opinion. Voters offer their 
support for a political system or policy through affective support (ideological or non-material belief 
in the value of the policy/system) and utilitarian support (when the system or policy increases the 
material (economic) well-being of an individual. According to Hix, much of the opposition to the 
euro stems from the affective belief that the euro is not of particular ideological or non-material 
benefit to the British which suggests the relevance of nationalist sentiment and identity politics 
combined with affective support for the pound. However, among professional employees and owners 
of businesses who perceive material gain from the introduction of the euro, utilitarian attitudes 
prevail. The export oriented business sector is the most consensually supportive group in favour of 
the euro.  
On the other hand, those in the lower paid industrial and service sector jobs and small business 
owners – less affected financially by currency fluctuations and more preoccupied with the potential 
difficulties created by the ‘sound money’ dimension of EMU – tend to be more anti-euro, paralleling 
their counterparts in other EU member states. The persuasiveness of the economic alternatives to the 
euro and the relatively strong affective support of the British for the pound combine to undermine 
support for the euro and stoke the opposition.  
It is tempting to conclude that public opinion directs policy making in Britain and that British 
governments are perhaps more responsive than those in Germany where hostile public opinion failed 
to block support for EMU. In other words, can an approach rooted in an understanding of the unique 
features of British democracy and policy making as somehow more responsive to public opinion 
help to explain British policy on the euro? The British have engaged in a lengthy and detailed debate 
and discussion on the economic merits and demerits of the euro in a variety of fora from the 
parliament and the political parties to various media, universities and so on. Unlike the interest group 
and elite-based approach to understanding European integration, an understanding of British policy 
on EMU could therefore be understood within the framework of popular sovereignty — especially in 
the insistence upon the need to use referendum.  
Such claims are highly contestable.(15) There may be preference for wide consultation and debate in 
British liberal democracy but this has not prevented British governments from appealing to Burkean 
notion of representative democracy – which is as important to the British conception of 
parliamentary democracy as popular sovereignty – sidelining public opinion and containing public 
debate. Moreover, British governments have rarely used referenda in the past. They have done so 
only on very important matters of change in governance which need the sanction of a public vote to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the decision: notably, joining the EC (post facto in 1975 on the 
renegotiated terms of entry) and devolution in Scotland and Wales. Referenda have not been used on 
other very important issues of governance — no EC / EU treaty since 1973 has been subject to a 
British referendum, nor have significant developments in British governance such as House of Lords 
reform. British governments have for the most part opposed the use of referenda seen as crude 
devices subject to grotesque manipulation and contrary to the Burkean ideal. Conservative 
governments have never held a referendum and refused to hold one on entry into the EC, even 
though the three other countries which had negotiated to join with Britain – Norway, Denmark and 
Ireland – each held one. One should thus appraise sceptically the Conservative Party’s insistence 
upon a referendum on both Britain’s participation in the euro and any future EU constitution. One 
must conclude that the Conservatives are now calling for a referendum for reasons unrelated to their 
preoccupation with popular sovereignty. It is likely that the development of European integration has 
progressed to such an extent that Conservative leaders are now willing to accept referenda as part of 
a blocking strategy if only out desperation. Party politics and the ambition to avoid intra-party 
squabbling on European matters also help to explain the current Tory preference for referenda. 
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A Labour government held the first British referendum in 1975 principally to prevent a politically 
debilitating split in the party given that several high profile ministers, the majority of the party’s 
members of parliament and much of the party rank and file were opposed to membership. The 
Conservative party is in a similar position today. However, this does not help to explain why the 
Labour government has promised a referendum on the euro, as divisions within the party on EMU 
and European integration are far less profound than they were on EC membership in the 1970s and 
80s. The Labour Party has been more willing than the Tories to use referenda to legitimize 
significant modifications of governance: holding a referendum on EMU — which obviously involves 
a significant modification of governance — thus conforms more to recently developed Labour 
tradition than a Conservative one. Furthermore, the decision to hold a referendum is seen by many in 
the party as rooted in party strategy to avoid a backlash at the polls were the government to press 
ahead with euro membership in the face of widespread public opposition in the country. However, 
the holding of a referendum that the government is likely to lose is also opposed on strategic 
grounds. While some in the Labour Government leadership may have initially harboured hopes that 
public opinion could be brought around in favour of euro membership (thus the creation of the 
lobbying association ‘Britain in Europe’) the commitment to invest the political resources to 
accomplish this transformation of opinion has never materialised.  
The role of the print media in shaping British public opinion in general and specifically with regard 
to European issues is subject to considerable academic debate. Firmstone (2003) argues that the 
division in elite opinion on the euro, the collapse of the left-right divide on the issue and the 
technical nature of the debate gives the British media a very important role to play in shaping public 
opinion. The British print media is divided on the ‘Europe’ and euro issues with more of the leading 
dailies in favour but circulation of the anti-European integration and anti-euro dailies far greater (see 
Firmstone 2003).(16) This should be juxtaposed with the almost unanimous support for EC 
membership in the run-up to the 1975 referendum on membership. Of course, some of the 
broadsheets can present a range of views in their guest commentaries (Kuhn 2000) but the leader 
editorial comment presents the ‘official’ position of the paper. The two best selling UK national 
daily broadsheets have been firmly against: the Daily Telegraph and Times with over 60 per cent of 
the national broadsheet circulation between them and almost 1.5 million readers.(17) The Financial 
Times, Guardian and Independent (with a combined circulation of just under a million (970,000)) 
have been generally but critically in favour of euro membership – while accepting the economic 
difficulties in the euro-zone (Firmstone 2003) – reflecting a broader Europhilia and in favour of 
holding a referendum on the matter in the near rather than distant future without the constraint of the 
five economic tests. The two best selling UK national daily tabloids have been consistently opposed 
to British membership of the euro-zone, reflecting a virulently antagonistic position on European 
integration: the Sun and the Daily Mail with a combined circulation of 5.9 million (August 2003 
figures). The Sun famously greeted the introduction of euro notes and coins as the ‘Dawn of a new 
Error’. The third, fourth and fifth best selling national tabloids, the Mirror (2 million circulation 
daily), the Daily Express (956,000) and the Daily Star (929,000) – with a combined circulation of 
almost 3.9 million – have embraced a consistently positive stance on the euro.  
Of particular concern to both the Major and Blair governments was the determined anti-euro position 
of the press owned by Australian-American tycoon Rupert Murdoch (including the Times and the 
Sun, the best selling British tabloid newspaper and also the Sky satellite channels). Murdoch swung 
the Sun and Times firmly in favour of a Labour victory in the June 1997 elections and New Labour’s 
preference to retain Murdoch’s allegiance encourages caution on the euro issue (Young 1999). 
Blair’s earlier claims to be willing to ‘take on’ the Euro-sceptic press in a future referendum 
(Guardian, 30 January 1999) should be judged by his caution hitherto on the issue.  
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Leonard and Arbuthnott (2001) cite the political editor of the Mirror group who claimed that the Sun
and the Mail would be the battleground in any future referendum contest and that ‘those that are 
leading the fight against EMU are obsessed with the subject and have a huge, unbalanced and 
dangerous influence on the government and broadcasting, especially the BBC’.  
6. Neo-pluralism: conflicting interests and government policy   
Neo-pluralist analyses of British politics tighten our focus upon the role of powerful interests and in 
particular the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) – the peak association for large British 
companies – with well-established, albeit informal, connections to the Conservative Party, and the 
Trade Union Congress (TUC) – the confederation of British trade unions – through its direct 
influence on the Labour Party with one-third of votes on party policy, financial support and overlap 
of personnel. On other European policy developments, the CBI actively pushed the Thatcher 
Government to agree to the Single European Act and Single European Market programme and 
actively opposed the social policy provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. The CBI adopted a policy in 
favour of the pound’s entry into the ERM in a majority vote in February 1985 as a means to bring 
down inflation and interest rates and completing the Single Market. On EMU, the CBI initially 
presented a critical but neutral policy, insisting that British entry ‘is largely a political 
decision’ (Confederation of British Industry 1989, 17, quoted in Talani (2000b)) but by 1990, the 
CBI was considerably more positive, recommending British entry into the ERM to play a full role in 
discussions on EMU. The CBI adopted a cautiously supportive role on EMU, initially approving the 
Delors Report but opposing the fiscal policy rules, but then, by 1992, supporting these fiscal rules to 
ensure convergence.  
The TUC was largely responsible for the Labour Party policy shift on European integration in the 
1980s, when the Congress was won over to a social democratic vision of European integration 
presented by the then Commission president Jacques Delors at the 1987 Bournemouth Annual 
Conference. However, the TUC trailed the Labour Party in embracing the EMU project. After over 
17 years of official hostility to British participation in European monetary arrangements, in 1989, the 
TUC voted to approve British entry in the ERM although there was a split on EMU membership, 
with the TUC Secretariat in favour but major component unions opposed. Finally, in July 1996, the 
General Council of the TUC endorsed a report advocating British membership in the proposed EMU. 
Support was qualified – in favour of a relaxed EMU timetable and flexible application of the 
convergence criteria – but the TUC had become ‘in the words of John Monks, “more committed to 
EMU and a single currency than any other national institution”’ (Josselin 2001, 62; see also Verdun 
2002). The official support of both the CBI and TUC and keen support from the leadership of these 
associations has led to the conclusion that ‘[r]arely has there been such wide interest group support 
[in the UK] for such a major decision of economic policy’ (Gamble & Kelly 2000, 2002). The gap 
between the CBI and Conservative positions has been marked, whereas the TUC secretariat’s 
position has very much conformed to that of the Labour Party, while the TUC itself lagged behind 
the Party in embracing a pro-EMU position. This suggests that focusing upon interest groups is not 
very helpful in explaining government policy.  
However what helps to explain the divergence in views between the two parties and their supporting 
constituencies is the significant divide between the elite of these organisations and their rank and file 
which corresponds to a more a generalised division between elite and mass public opinion on the 
euro (Hix 2000) (elite support for the euro at 60 per cent is double that of mass public support).
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The directors of numerous high profile member companies of the CBI oppose British membership in 
the euro and participate in the well-resourced group ‘Business for Sterling’ which merged into the 
no-euro group in 2000 (see http://www.no-euro.com/whoweare/bfs.asp for a full list of current 
members). Support for membership amongst the directors of the 500 largest British companies has 
fluctuated over the past decade, reaching heights of 70 per cent in favour in 1998 with less than half 
by mid 2003 (Financial Times, 15 December 2003). Small and medium sized businesses represented 
by the British Chambers of Commerce with activities directed principally at the domestic market 
have adopted an even less favourable position on the euro. In October 2002, asked what their 
position would be if the Treasury found that the five economic tests were met, 13 per cent would not 
join under any circumstances, 49 per cent wanted the government to wait and see how the euro 
developed before joining, 35 per cent would support entry as soon as practicable.(18) These figures 
should be compared to those for CBI members – respectively 15, 31 and 52 per cent – demonstrating 
division but a more overall confident stance.(19)  
The rapid rise of the pound in relation to the euro in 1999 and 2000 (from 1.41 euro at the start of 
1999 to 1.63 euro 21 months later) resulted directly in several high profile manufacturing closures in 
the UK yet did not result in any dramatic shift in manufacturing or public opinion or Labour 
government policy with regard to British participation in the euro. There was considerable lobbying 
of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England to cut interest rates and lobbying on the 
Blair government for British entry into the euro. The collapse of the British Rover Group in August 
2000 contributed to the widespread perception at the time that the exchange rate between sterling 
and the euro was damaging the profitability of British automotive production, deterring foreign 
investment and damaging British industry more generally. Although automobile production 
constituted only a small percentage of British manufacturing and economic output, this was a 
politically sensitive sector of the economy. Rather than modify its policy on the pound, the 
government sought to subsidise the automobile manufacturers (Jones 2002, 133). Other industries 
affected badly by the strong pound saw such subsidies policy as insufficient. During the winter of 
2000-2001, the management of Corus, the Anglo-Dutch steel manufacturer and former British Steel, 
without even bothering to explore the possibility of government aid, decided to lay off more than 
6000 mostly Labour voting workers citing lack of competitiveness as the principal justification. The 
government clearly put such high profile closures in the wider economic context with unemployment 
at its lowest levels since the early 1980s. Many other manufacturing and service sector companies 
did not suffer irreparable damage. Thus exchange volatility and the considerable appreciation of the 
pound did not create sufficiently strong political pressure on the government to act on the euro 
question.  
Two of the major component unions of the TUC have consistently embraced strong opposing 
positions on British participation in the euro-zone – UNISON (the public sector union) and the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) – and form the leading components of Trade Unions 
Against the Single Currency campaign group (TUASC). As Frieden (1991) predicts the sectoral 
orientation of the trade union broadly dictated the policy line taken, with private sector unions (such 
as the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU)) with members affected by exchange 
rate fluctuations particularly supportive of EMU and forming a main component of the Trade Unions 
for Europe campaign group. However, Josselin (2001) points about that the centralised nature of the 
TUC enabled the secretariat to take a strongly favourable position on EMU despite the opposition of 
a large number of members. The Labour government, it might be argued, has been more sensitive to 
the significant division of views in the labour movement. In 1997, the newly elected Blair 
government rejected the TUC leadership’s call to move to quick referendum on EMU. The divisions 
within the CBI and TUC on the euro can be seen as an example of a more general division in these 
two organisations on a range of issues (Jones and Kavanagh 1998) and more fluid ties to their former 
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The attitudes in the financial services sector have been likewise divided between the pros and cons of 
British entry into EMU siding towards the cons (Talani 2000a & b) with a large majority of directors 
of leading British banks and other financial services companies consistently indifferent to British 
participation in the EMU (see for example Financial Times, ‘City Indifferent to Euro’, 5 June 2003) 
with similar attitudes among the hundreds of foreign banks and companies operating in the city. 
Negative attitudes reflect the view that British participation in EMU would potentially undermine the 
City’s leading international role. However, there is a pro-euro lobby in the City (City in Europe). 
Given the importance of the City of London (and the financial sector more generally) to the 
prosperity of the UK, such attitudes have provided backing for negative Conservative policy on the 
euro and hesitant Labour Government policy. Reluctance in this sector to participate European 
monetary integration is long-standing. British Banks and financial services companies were highly 
sceptical of the merits of British membership of the ERM, although by the late 1980s most approved 
of British membership but principally as an anti-inflationary device. A majority of City firms were 
opposed to EMU generally and British participation. The City was concerned that placing the future 
ECB elsewhere would be a damaging blow to its status as many smaller European banks might leave 
but this was not enough to ensure support for British participation. Since 1999, the ‘City’ (financial 
sector) has adjusted well to the advent of the euro. With only a limited threat of lost business to 
continental financial centres, the majority of financial firms see no need for Britain to join EMU in 
order for the City to maintain its position as far and away the leading European financial centre.  
Over the past decade several new interest groups have been established by politicians and business 
leaders opposed to and in favour of British membership in the euro. Unlike the sectoral interests of 
the CBI and TUC, these single issue groups have been created to shape public opinion specifically 
on the euro, although in the ‘pre-campaign’ stage lobbying efforts are directed principally towards 
the policy and increasingly media arenas rather than waging a full battle for public opinion (Gray 
2003). Nonetheless, some very public campaigning has already taken place in particular from the no-
side, engaging the services of high profile celebrities. Not all the no-side groups associate themselves 
with the broader Euroscepticism of, say, the Bruges Group. The ‘New Europe’ group led by former 
Labour Foreign Secretary and SDP founder, Lord David Owen, is officially in favour of British 
membership in the EU (http://www.new-europe.co.uk/ ). Gray (2003) provides a full list of research 
organisations, campaign coalitions and campaign organisations on the euro issue, part of which is 
reproduced in table 1. Usherwood (2002) sees these campaign groups as the continuation of intra- 
and inter-party politics by other means, which if true, would deny the distinct importance of these 
groups in shaping government policy. However, given the large number of non-political leaders 
involved in these groups, Usherwood’s claim is at best problematic.  
Table 1  
The number of anti-euro groups far exceeds those in favour of the euro, with five umbrella alliance 
organisations versus only one (Britain in Europe). However, the anti-euro campaigners are more 
diverse ideologically and form looser alliances (Gray 2003). Although precise figures are not 
available, the anti-euro groups also spend a great deal more than the pro-euro groups. One anti-euro 
businessman who has attracted a great deal of media attention is Paul Sykes, having dedicated a 
large amount of his own personal fortune to the cause as part of the Democracy Movement and the 
British Democracy Campaign.  
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The two major pro and anti-euro alliances attract the lion’s share of media attention because they are 
well-resourced and are seen as the principal authoritative sources of information on the euro from the 
two perspectives. The leading no-side group is the ‘No campaign’ (http:// www.no-euro.com/ ) 
which is officially in favour of British membership in the EU, unlike some of the anti-euro groups, 
but opposed EMU. Formed in 1999 by leading pro-euro politicians from the three largest parties, the 
‘Britain in Europe’ campaign is an umbrella organisation for diverse pro-European and euro groups 
(http://www.britainineurope.org.uk ). Currently headed by Colin Marshall, the Chairman of British 
Airways, ‘Britain in Europe’ brings together pro-European politicians from all the parties, leading 
figures from the world of business, trade unions and other sections of society (see the website for a 
full list of members). Each of these groups is funded by donation and comprises a full time 
secretariat dedicated to compiling large amounts of information supporting their respective positions 
and disseminating this information through websites, the media and talks to the public, various 
organisations and university students. It is problematic to claim that the activities of these groups 
explain government policy on the euro. However, the energetic ‘no-side’ – emphasising a ‘people 
versus politicians’ campaign – has likely contributed to the Labour Government’s caution on the 
matter. Moreover, research has demonstrated the great impact that referendum campaigns can have 
on public opinion on British membership especially ‘where elites are divided on the referendum 
issue, where ideological alignments on the issue are unclear and there are low levels of public 
knowledge on the issue’ as on the euro (Gray 2003, 3; Le Duc 2002). There are more constraints 
imposed on the Britain in Europe group as, created by pro-euro members of the three main parties, it 
is in a difficult balancing position and cannot push the government too hard on holding a 
referendum. The former director, Simon Buckby, has called on the government not to chicken out 
and hold a referendum (‘Euro campaign urges Blair to act’, BBC News Online, 8 May 2002). 
However, since the June 2003 announcement of the Treasury Report on the euro and the certainty of 
a much delayed referendum, the wind is very much out of the sails of this pro-euro group, with 
donations drying up. As mentioned above, in September 2003, Buckby resigned in protest at the 
government’s inaction.  
7. The importance of domestic politics   
The disinterest and opposition of many important manufacturing and financial companies has an 
impact on government, which effectively counters the strong support for EMU in both the CBI and 
TUC leaderships. A Downsian analysis explains some feature of each party’s policy given the nature 
of public opinion on the euro question but the alignment is only partial between median voter 
attitudes and the policies of the two parties: a less hostile Conservative opposition policy and a more 
active Labour government campaign to shift public opinion might be expected. Intra-party politics 
has been of great significance in shaping Conservative party policy and may – through the dynamics 
of the Blair-Brown rivalry and simmering Euroscepticism in Labour party ranks – explain the current 
government’s delay in holding the referendum. The dangers of the powerful Eurosceptic press and 
lobby further dissuade government activism on the issue. For the Labour Government in its second 
term and likely to enter a third, why bother spending a great deal of effort and political capital on a 
second (even third) order issue even if a majority of public opinion could be convinced to support 
the euro. Many will be resentful that the government has devoted so much attention and time to an 
issue that is far less important than the improvement of public services.  
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(1) Many commentators (journalists, politicians and academic economists, including Michael Artis 
in this special edition) have attacked the five tests as overlapping and imprecise. 
(2) OECD (2000) Economic survey of the United Kingdom, June 2000, recommendation. 
(3) The BAG includes representatives from business and trade organisations, the Consumers’ 
Association and the Trades Union Congress. 
(4) LATE (Labour Against the Euro) ‘holds meetings, uses personal contacts and makes speeches at 
relevant conferences to influence the Labour movement – both Labour MPs and the trade unions – to 
come out against the euro. LATE’s Secretary John Cryer MP has claimed the group was formed to 
put pressure on the ‘great mass of the Parliamentary Labour Party’ as well as on the trade unions, 
which he views as ‘absolutely key in the future of this debate … because of all their membership.’ 
Speech by John Cryer MP, Secretary of Labour Against the Euro, at the Eighth Congress for 
Democracy, Church House, Westminister, 1 November 2002. See 
http://www.congressfordemocracy.org.uk/ .  
(5) Polls indicate that Conservative Party voters are far more likely to oppose British participation in 
the euro (see for example, 25 June 2000 MORI, Commissioned by News of the World 
http://www.mori.com/polls/2000/notw000623.shtml . 
(6) Hague even went so far as to embrace a ‘pick and choose’ approach to the acquis communautaire
and the party manifesto claims that the ‘Conservatives [would] be the only major party fighting the 
next election determined to stop the surrender of our most precious right as a country – the right to 
govern ourselves.' 
(7)For a full list of MORI polls over the past three decades on the public’s views of priority political 
issues see http://www.mori.com/polls/2003/mpm030916-top.shtml .  
(8) In June 1997, Europe was important at 30 per cent but well being Education and Health at 45 and 
51. In June 2001, Europe was important at 24 percent but well behind Health, Education and Crime 
with Health reaching 58 per cent. 
(9) This also applies for those who support British adoption of the euro. Since 1996, 
‘waverers’ (those that could be persuade to change their minds and vote in a referendum) range from 
42 per cent of the population to 59 per cent. See http://www.mori.com/europe/euro-
participation.shtml 
(10) For a recent Eurobarometer survey of opinion see 
http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth170603_en.pdf. 
(11) For example, a 25 June 2000 MORI, Commissioned by News of the World 
(http://www.mori.com/polls/2000/notw000623.shtml) show results to responses to the following 
question: ‘In a referendum, would you vote for or against Britain replacing the pound sterling with 
the single European currency?’ 64 per cent of those surveyed would vote against with only 24 per 
cent in favour. This no-vote figure rises to 83 among Tory supporters (only 12 per cent in favour) but 
also is in a majority for Labour party supporters (51 per cent with 35 in favour) and Liberal 
Democratic party supporters (56 per cent with only 28 in favour). The same poll also indicated that a 
majority of voters of each of the three parties wanted a public debate and referendum before joining 
(57 Conservatives, 63 Labour, 57 Liberal Democrat).
Seite 18 von 19 EIoP: Text 2004-017: Full Text
06.10.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-017.htm(12) At the start of 2003, the Swedish yes side had a lead of 15 per cent; all the political parties 
(except the extreme left) and the business groups, most of the trade unions leadership and every 
major newspaper were in favour (while opposition in the Social Democratic government was 
silenced). The assassination of the very popular pro-euro foreign minister encouraged a sympathy 
yes vote.  
(13) MORI poll published 1 July 2003; see also http://www.mori.com/polls/2003/mpm030622-
top.shtml). 
(14) See footnote 10. 
(15) For a survey of different policy styles in Britain and several West European countries see 
Jeremy Richardson, ed. (1982) Policy Styles in Western Europe, London: Allen and Unwin. 
(16) All figures are from August 2003. Audit Bureau of Circulations.  
(17) August 2003 figures from the Audit Bureau of Circulations.  
(18) http://www.mori.com/polls/2002/bcc-topline.shtml. 
(19) Mori poll from 1999 cited at http://www.cbi.org.uk. 
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Groups campaigning for and against the euro in Britain, 1999-
2002  
(not including party fractions and specifically business and union organisations)  
Source: Gray (2003)  
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Type of organisation Pro-euro Anti-euro
Research organisation  
(single issue think tanks; 
focusing principally upon the 
policy arena)
Action Centre for 
Europe (Lord Geoffrey 
Howe)
New Europe  
Global Britain European Research Group  
European Foundation 
Campaign organisation 
(coalition/alliance)
Britain in Europe No Campaign  
Anti-Maastricht Alliance (AMA)  
Congress for Democracy  
The European Alliance of EU-Critical 
Movements (TEAM) Campaign Alliance 
for Referendums in Parishes 
Campaign organisations 
(single issue groups) 
Citizens for Europe 
European Movement 
Young European 
Movement 
Democracy Movement Campaign for an 
Independent Britain (CIB) British 
Democracy Campaign Campaign Against 
Euro-Federalism Freedom Association  
New Alliance Youth for a Free Europe  
The Bruges Group Anti-Common Market 
League 
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